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What would she have gone on to write and by what right do I speak 
about it? In preparing these words for this session in memory of Pleshette 
DeArmitt’s work, I found myself haunted by that thought and those 
phrases.  She was supposed to have been here with us.  Thinking about her 
present absence at SPEP this year and at every SPEP from now on, no longer 
can we imagine what, alive, she will have written for this occasion, but 
rather what she might have written.  What she might have written, that is, 
had she not horribly, cruelly, unfairly, unbearably been taken from us before 
her time.   
Re-reading her work now is especially painful because much—if not 
all—of her writing is about learning how to mourn.  Or, rather, how not to 
mourn. Everywhere she writes about the impossible distinction between 
mourning and melancholia and about the ethical limits and political pitfalls 
of seeking to avoid the fear of loss by seeking consolation in philosophy or 
art.1  In essays that now take on an added poignancy, drawing on writings 
by Sarah Kofman and Jacques Derrida, she calls for a melancholic thinking 
of both mourning and narcissism that impossibly affirms the pain of death 
so as to remain in touch with the life of the one who has died.  In text after 
text, she explored the painful double binds of mourning.  No love without 
mourning, no life without death, no relation to the other without narcissism. 
Pleshette DeArmitt’s book, The Right to Narcissism: A Case for Im-Possible 
Self-Love, is a call to rehabilitate the concept of narcissism by showing that it 
is an ineluctable structure constitutive of human subjectivity rather than a 
pathological symptom.  The book explores what happens to the very notion 
of the self once one recognizes that narcissism is a condition of possibility for 
subjectivity rather than something that happens to a subject who is already 
constituted.  In her probing discussions of Rousseau, Kristeva, and Derrida, 
she shows how, paradoxically, self-love is not the other to love, but rather 
that which makes the relation to the other possible.  
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I have been dwelling in Pleshette’s writings over the past several weeks.  
In my own melancholy, unable to accept the basic, and apparently 
irrefutable fact that there will be no more of them, I found myself pouring 
over her texts for traces, spoor, signs, omens, augurs, of her (now 
impossible) future writings.  And, in the process, something strange started 
to happen.  I began to look past the many polished and elegant formulations 
in the body of her texts and my gaze focused instead on the moments where 
Pleshette indicated, sometimes by the barest phrase or gesture, what she 
may have wanted to pursue in the future.  I started to see some patterns in 
the raw and vital questions that she exuberantly announces in footnotes and 
the still emerging potent insights that lurk in the margins of her reflections 
on the relationship between narcissism, alterity, and mourning. 
Somewhat to my surprise, one of the things I found was that her book 
(and indeed her entire corpus) is haunted by—and obsessively turns 
around—a text by Freud that it does not address directly.  Freud’s “On 
Narcissism: An Introduction” is everywhere and nowhere in Pleshette’s 
work.2  I mean no disrespect to her by observing this.  The force of her 
avoidance of this text is so palpable—and so prevalent—that it becomes an 
interesting and rigorous reading in its own right.   
Pleshette does mention “On Narcissism” on several occasions in The 
Right to Narcissism.  But those occasions are mostly either in footnotes, 
textual asides, or via Julia Kristeva’s highly idiosyncratic (and—in my 
view—inadequate) recapitulation of Freud’s argument.  Nonetheless, 
despite the lack of explicit commentary on it, Freud’s text on narcissism 
operates like a secret conduit that connects some of the most powerful 
insights in her readings of Rousseau, Kristeva, and Derrida to one another.  
More strangely still, at every point she refers or alludes to Freud’s text, a 
potent latent question blooms, like a flower, like an open wound. 
For example, in the middle of a discussion of Kristeva’s reading of 
Freud, she stops to wonder why:  
when Freud’s Narcissus appears as a “subject,” he most 
frequently appears as a woman (or occasionally as a 
homosexual, i.e., a feminized man). [...] Whether as subject 
or object, ego or other, Narcissus, after nearly two 
thousand years as a pubescent male, undergoes a sex 
change.  This, however, is another story— ....therefore, we 
will put aside this curious shift for another time.3  
Another time.  The footnote that accompanies the (now awful) promise to 
revisit this question “another time” is three pages long.  In that long and 
impassioned footnote, Pleshette calls attention to the fact that Freud’s 
depiction of the narcissistic woman as self-sufficient in “On Narcissism” 
appears to contradict his many depictions of woman as “narcissistically 
wounded” by her lack of a penis in most of his texts about sexuality and 
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sexual difference. This footnote is closely related to an unpublished paper 
that she gave at SPEP in 2011 and is clearly the basis for a longer and more 
sustained future reflection on narcissism and sexual difference in Freud’s 
writings.4 As I publicly responded to Pleshette’s provocative argument at 
that SPEP in 2011, I will put aside further reflections about how she may 
have gone on to develop those ideas for yet another time.  
In her reading of Rousseau, Freud’s “On Narcissism” pops up 
somewhat unexpectedly in a footnote to the argument detailing the 
paradoxical and complex relationship between “amour de soi” (self-love) and 
“amour-propre” (self-regard).  In that footnote, Pleshette writes, “It is 
interesting to note that in his seminal essay “On Narcissism,” Freud also 
employs the examples of the child’s self-satisfaction and the sick person’s 
self absorption to illustrate the narcissistic disposition.”5  As the footnote 
indicates, there are powerful connections to be made between Rousseau and 
Freud.  Although she doesn’t pursue the question here, she implicitly 
suggests that one could compare Rousseau’s distinction between “amour de 
soi” (self-love) and “amour propre” (self-regard) to Freud’s distinction 
between primary and secondary narcissism.  Moreover, because the 
inaugural argument of Pleshette’s book takes off from the claim that 
Rousseau’s inability to establish a clear distinction between these two forms 
of self-love obliges him to introduce an irreducible alterity into the very 
constitution of the self, and because she herself alludes, albeit obliquely, to 
the similarities between the description of narcissism in Rousseau and 
Freud, one can only mourn the fact that she did not pursue the question of 
how the alterity that she discovers in Rousseau might have found a 
fascinating counterpoint in Freud’s attempts to differentiate primary and 
secondary narcissism.   
Freud’s “On Narcissism” is also highly present and absent in the 
Kristeva section of the book. In its central chapter, “Reconceiving Freud’s 
Narcissus,” Pleshette makes it clear that her explicit aim is to rehabilitate 
Freud’s concept of narcissism by reclaiming that concept from Freud.  
Therefore, instead of looking directly at Freud’s text, she chooses to focus 
her attention on two critical readings of it: Sarah Kofman’s feminist critique 
in The Enigma of Woman and Julia Kristeva’s feminist/analytical re-writing of 
the psychic structure of narcissism in Tales of Love and New Maladies of the 
Soul.  In the chapter called “Reconceiving Freud’s Narcissus,” Freud’s text 
on narcissism is communicated almost entirely through Kristeva’s words 
and conceptual framework.  While this produces a very powerful and 
moving reading of Kristeva’s understanding of primary narcissistic 
identification as a ternary structure through which “in receiving the other’s 
words, in chewing on and swallowing these sounds, the infant becomes 
bound to the third in love,”6 the chapter is nonetheless haunted by the 
absence of a more direct and sustained engagement with the vertiginous 
complexities of Freud’s text.  Curiously, in “Reconceiving Freud’s 
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Narcissus,” Ovid seems to take the place of Freud.  The DeArmitt/Kristeva 
readings of Ovid’s narcissus replace and displace the missing reading of 
Freud’s text in ways that are intriguing and suggestive.  In one of the most 
compelling passages of the book, Pleshette calls attention to the implications 
of Kristeva’s reading of Echo and Narcissus in Tales of Love by reminding us 
that Ovid recounts Echo’s predicament of being condemned to repeat the 
words of the other prior to his depiction of the scene in which Narcissus 
becomes enamored with and alienated from his own image in the pool of 
water.  By insisting on the fact that Echo’s echoes both announce and 
prefigure Narcissus’s subsequent self-doubling, Pleshette (following 
Kristeva) underscores the fact that Echo and Narcissus are inseparable from 
one another and that they are inverted images of one another.  Narcissus’s 
specular discovery that he is other to himself repeats and echoes Echo’s 
inability to speak by herself.  Here, as elsewhere in the book, Pleshette 
DeArmitt’s rehabilitation of Narcissus entails a recognition of the fact that 
Echo was always already in the scene with Narcissus and therefore that the 
other participates in the construction of the self from the beginning.  No 
Narcissus without Echo.  
Freud’s “On Narcissism” also haunts the section of the book devoted to 
Derrida.  At a critical moment, Pleshette cites a passage from Derrida’s 
Memoires for Paul de Man in which he calls for the “necessity” of re-reading of 
Freud’s “On Narcissism” together with Paul de Man’s writings on Narcissus 
and allegory:  
On the question of Narcissus and the aforementioned 
narcissism, it will one day be necessary to read (and I am 
certain that someone will) those infinitely complicated 
texts on narcissism: namely, Freud’s “On Narcissism: An 
Introduction,” together with all the numerous and 
inexhaustible texts in which Paul de Man puts Narcissus 
back in play.7  
Pleshette glosses this quote by suggesting that Derrida’s own texts perform 
the very task he calls for when she writes, “It is Derrida...who has put 
Narcissus back on the scene by re-working the structures of self-relation in 
terms of the experiences of vision and of voice.”8  But let us be clear about 
something: it is no accident that Derrida proposes to send in a proxy, some 
future reader, to do his reading for him when he here puts aside a future 
reading of “On Narcissism” for “another time.”  
As Derrida knows only too well, narcissism in Freud (in all of its guises 
and all of its vicissitudes) never in fact describes a state of self-identity or of 
felicitous self-love.  Narcissism—as it is lived by any subject, male or female, 
homosexual or heterosexual—is the source of a never-ending fatal love story 
consisting of alienation, aggression, cannibalism, and suffering.  As Freud 
explains in “On Narcissism: An Introduction,” we are condemned to love so 
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as not to become sick but being in love makes us suffer and became sick.  
Moreover, contrary to what Kofman and Kristeva suggest, Freud himself 
openly concedes that the gender positions that he briefly and weakly assigns 
to two different modes of loving (anaclitic and narcissistic) are resolutely 
untenable.  Any and every attempt to ascribe sex or gender positions to 
loving produces hallucinatory vertigo because we are all perpetually torn 
between narcissistic love (in which we attempt to take ourselves as the object 
of love) and object-love (in which we attempt to love another).  More 
importantly, as Freud also points out, in order to survive, we must love the 
other in the self and the self in the other.  When love fails (either because of 
an excess of self-love or an excess of love of the other), it is, as Freud himself 
explicitly puts it, nothing less than “the end of the world.”9  If there is too 
much love for the other, the world ends in suicide, if there is too much love 
for the self, the world ends in psychosis.  In “Mourning and Melancholia,” 
Freud famously writes that “in mourning it is the world which has become 
poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself.”10 But the very fact that 
the world can be drained, or cease to be, indicates how very precariously it 
was constructed in the first place.  
Some readers of Derrida’s Work of Mourning might be surprised to learn 
that the phrase “the end of the world” occupies such a pivotal place in 
Freud’s “On Narcissism.”11  But if, as Derrida insists, and as Pleshette 
repeatedly quotes him as saying, there is “no one narcissism,” and 
“narcissism has no contrary, no other side, no beyond, and love for the 
other, respect for the other, self-denial in favor of the other do not interrupt 
any narcissistic moment,” it is because narcissism is not merely an element 
of madness within subjectivity, it is the very name for the madness of 
subject.  Subjectivity is a precarious compromise formation that allows the 
world to come into being.  
If we read it in light of Pleshette’s injunction to understand narcissism 
as “a structure and not a symptom,” Freud’s “On Narcissism” compels us to 
reckon with the thought that the other side of the subject is not the object, 
but the end of the world itself.  Moreover, because the very essence of 
narcissism is an abyssal inability to differentiate between love of self and 
love of the other, the threat of madness and death that is inherent to 
narcissism does not lie outside or beyond the structure of subjectivity, it is 
constitutive of it.  All narcissistic structures are maddening because they are 
all mad.  Pleshette has shown us that Narcissus and Echo are not two 
distinct figures with two distinct sexes and destinies, but two allegories of 
the same structural madness that we call love.  And, as she intimated 
throughout her work, in any elaboration of narcissism worthy of the name 
(and here I would include Ovid, Rousseau, Freud, de Man, Derrida, 
Kofman, for starters) one can no longer distinguish other from self, desire 
from identification, reality from fantasy, male from female, child from 
parent, or life from death.  
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As I imagine many of us have observed, Pleshette often liked to begin 
and end her papers by echoing the words of others.  Like Echo, her voice 
was never more her own than when she spoke through quotation.  We who 
are left here without Pleshette will have only begun to read the words she 
left with us.  We will now need to echo all of the voices in her writings as we 
go on to think about what she put aside for another time.   
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